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Abstract
In the field of welfare attitude research, generally studies examining critical attitudes toward the welfare 
state are rather limited. However, the existing studies find that people are most negative about the mis-
targeting of welfare benefits – that is, people are particularly critical of the high overuse (misuse or fraud) 
and high underuse (non-take-up) of welfare benefits. This study contributes to the current literature 
by more extensively analyzing perceptions of the overuse and underuse of welfare benefits by revealing 
the underlying perceptions of moral failure or failed administrative implementation. We also assess how 
different individual- and contextual-level factors influence those perceptions. We use data from the 
European Social Survey 2008/2009 for 25 European countries. We find that instead of representing two 
manifestations of the same concept of mis-targeting, perceptions of the overuse and underuse of benefits 
appear to be driven by normative ideas and opinions about the administrative effectiveness of the welfare 
state. Whereas normative ideas about the overuse of benefits are mainly influenced by people’s political 
ideology and the selectivity of the redistribution system, ideas about the effectiveness of benefits are 
mainly influenced by people’s institutional trust, the quality of the welfare state and the economic context. 
We conclude that critical attitudes toward the welfare state have multiple dimensions and can be both 
substantive and procedural in nature.
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Introduction
In previous decades, welfare attitude research focused on what was called the ‘positive’ elements 
of the welfare state. Most of these studies built their analyses on survey questions that ask people 
whether they would like to see more government spending on various social programs and/or 
whether government should take more responsibility for providing social welfare (for instance, 
Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Brooks and Manza, 2007; Gelissen, 2000; Meier Jæger, 2007; 
Svallfors, 2003). In focusing on the responsibilities of the welfare state and the amount of social 
spending, most studies in the field addressed the condition of substantive justice that is an essential 
element of welfare state legitimacy (Rothstein, 1998). This condition demands that the public sup-
ports welfare programs as such and that these programs be considered just and fair. However, 
Rothstein (1998) argued that the welfare state should also fulfill the conditions of both redistribu-
tional justice – a fair distribution of contributions to the welfare state – and procedural justice – an 
effective and efficient implementation of welfare policies. Although welfare attitudes are crucial 
for understanding the legitimacy of the welfare state, there is little research on comparative welfare 
attitudes that focuses not only on whether people believe that the distribution of contributions is 
fair, but also on whether the implementation of welfare is effective and efficient.
Welfare support studies that include both items that measure preferences for government spend-
ing and responsibility and items that measure issues of redistributional and procedural justice all 
suggest that a focus on ‘positive’ items only may offer a too-rosy picture of the legitimacy of the 
welfare state (Roosma et al., 2012; Sihvo and Uusitalo, 1995a; Van Oorschot and Meuleman, 
2011). Those studies invariably show that the European public is relatively critical of not only the 
performance and outcomes of welfare systems (especially in Southern and Eastern Europe) but 
also procedural justice: the European public tends to perceive that their countries’ welfare systems 
have relatively high degrees of bureaucracy and low degrees of both efficiency and effectiveness 
(Roosma et al., 2012). More specifically, studies that examine critical attitudes toward the welfare 
state conclude that people are most critical about the mis-targeting of welfare benefits in terms of 
both the abuse and the non-take-up of benefits (Edlund, 1999; Ervasti, 1998, 2012; Goul Andersen, 
1999; Halvorsen, 2002). In other words, European people strongly support the state’s provision of 
welfare but are critical about the process through which that provision takes place, especially with 
respect to targeting benefits to the people who belong to the (perceived) target population. If we 
want to make claims about the social legitimacy of welfare states, we should examine these critical 
perceptions of the mis-targeting of benefits more closely.
The mis-targeting of welfare benefits contains both an element of overuse of benefits (i.e. ben-
efit abuse or misuse) and an element of underuse (i.e. the non-take-up of benefits). Several scholars 
find that attitudes toward overuse and underuse are only weakly related: a person’s perception of 
the overuse of benefits does not say much about his or her perception of underuse (Ervasti, 2012; 
Roosma et al., 2012; Sihvo and Uusitalo, 1995a). Therefore, overuse and underuse perceptions do 
not seem to be complementary parts of one perceived concept of ineffective redistribution. This 
raises questions about what perceptions of mis-targeting actually entail. What types of underlying 
welfare attitudes play a role when people observe mis-targeted benefits?
In this article, we contribute to knowledge about the critical aspects of welfare legitimacy by 
providing a more detailed analysis of perceptions of mis-targeting of social benefits in European 
welfare states. We inspect the underlying attitudes that establish perceptions of over- and underuse 
and distinguish normative perceptions of moral failure and perceptions of failed administrative 
implementation. We formulate three research questions: (1) What are the European public’s per-
ceptions of the mis-targeting of welfare benefits with respect to both over- and underuse? (2) What 
underlying attitudes establish perceptions of the mis-targeting of welfare benefits? (3) Which 
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individual and contextual factors are associated with Europeans’ perceptions of the mis-targeting 
of welfare benefits?
Perceptions of the mis-targeting of welfare benefits
Targeting benefits and services most generally means that social policies are directed to specific 
categories of citizens under specific conditions. The more strictly the target population is defined, 
the more selective the social policy. Only those who are considered to be deserving of a benefit 
should be eligible for it, and all who are eligible for the benefit should receive it. In the event that 
the actual distribution of benefits and services deviates from this ideal, we define mis-targeting 
(Van Oorschot, 2001). The concept of mis-targeting can be evaluated from the perspective of 
redistributional justice: does the target population really deserve these benefits? In addition, mis-
targeting can be evaluated from the perspective of procedural justice: is the target population (as 
opposed to the non-targeted population) eligible for the benefit and does the eligible population 
(as opposed to the non-eligible population) actually receive this benefit?
Mis-targeting can involve either the overuse or underuse of benefits or both. Underuse means 
that people who are seen as deserving of benefits do not belong to the target population or (when 
they do belong to the target population) are not eligible for benefits or do not receive the (full) 
benefit or service for which they are eligible. This can be either unintentional (e.g. due to ignorance 
of social rights or administrative mistakes) or intentional (when, for example, a benefit is not 
claimed for fear of stigmatization or out of shame). Overuse refers specifically to situations in 
which people receive a benefit or service while they are not seen as deserving of that benefit or for 
which they are not (fully) eligible. If overuse is intentional, the term ‘welfare fraud’ or ‘welfare 
abuse’ is used; unintentional overuse may be called ‘unintended’ overuse or misuse.
Previous empirical studies of mis-targeting mostly focused on perceptions of benefit overuse. 
These studies all find large proportions of populations perceiving overuse of welfare benefits 
(Ervasti, 1998, 2012; Goul Andersen, 1999; Halvorsen, 2002). In European comparative studies 
that analyze attitudes toward a broad range of welfare dimensions, perceived overuse is often 
standing in stark contrast to mostly positive perceptions of social programs and social rights 
(Roosma et al., 2012; Sihvo and Uusitalo, 1995a; Svallfors, 1991; Van Oorschot and Meuleman, 
2011). Moreover, in studies in which overuse is analyzed as part of other critical welfare attitudes 
– for example, the bureaucracy of the welfare state or the idea that welfare makes people lazy – it 
often appears as the most problematic issue perceived by the public (Ervasti, 1998, 2012; Goul 
Andersen, 1999; Halvorsen, 2002). What receives less attention is that Europeans also tend to see 
relatively large degrees of underuse of social benefits (Ervasti, 2012; Roosma et al., 2012).
Overuse and underuse perceptions can be related in different ways. First, from a theoretical 
perspective, we see these perceptions as two related sub-dimensions of the larger concept of per-
ceived mis-targeting, meaning that if people perceive mis-targeting, they see both overuse and 
underuse. However, the few studies that analyze overuse and underuse perceptions in combination 
find only small intercorrelations between the two (Ervasti, 2012; Roosma et al., 2012; Sihvo and 
Uusitalo, 1995a), which suggests that both concepts are relatively independent of one another. 
Second, and consequently, overuse and underuse perceptions are two distinct, unrelated concepts, 
as implied by Ervasti’s (2012) argument that overuse and underuse ‘measure different types of 
welfare state criticism’ (p. 245).
We want to add a third possibility, which is that overuse and underuse perceptions are based 
upon two different underlying attitudes, which in turn, at a deeper level, are both related to mis-
targeting. In this respect, our idea is that the concept of mis-targeting contains both a moral or 
normative element and a procedural or administrative element. This perspective recognizes that 
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some people intentionally attempt to abuse the system and some people unintentionally receive 
something that they do not deserve or for which they are not eligible. Benefit overuse can thus be 
considered a consequence either of moral failure or of administrative faults. In addition, benefit 
underuse can be the result of moral barriers such as feelings of shame or stigmatization among 
(potential) beneficiaries. Alternatively, it can be the result of administrative mistakes or ineffective 
implementation (Van Oorschot, 1995). These normative and administrative aspects might also play 
a role in evaluating the occurrence of the overuse and the underuse of benefits. Perceptions of high 
overuse can express a moral rejection of expected benefit abuse, or conversely, it can express a lack 
of trust in the system’s effectiveness. Perceiving high underuse of benefits can express either a 
normative judgment that sees the target population as too strictly defined by policymakers or a lack 
of trust in the system’s effectiveness.
This distinction between normative attitudes toward the welfare state and attitudes formed by 
the perceived effectiveness of the welfare state’s administrative practices can be found in the wel-
fare state support literature (Offe, 1987; Rothstein, 1998). Rothstein (1998) distinguishes norma-
tive support for the welfare state and the necessity of perceived effectiveness of the implementation 
of the welfare system. Additionally, Offe (1987) argues that legitimacy depends not only on the 
normative justifiability of the welfare state but also on experiences with the outcomes. Attitudes 
about the welfare state are ‘rationally formed in response to perceived social realities as well as to 
the actual experiences with the practice of existing welfare states’ (Offe, 1987: 535). Attitudes 
about the mis-targeting of benefits could contain both this more normative substantive judgment 
about whether benefits are fairly distributed and a procedural judgment about whether the admin-
istrative implementation of this redistribution is effective.
Individual factors influencing mis-targeting perceptions
Before we report the empirical findings, we introduce our expectations regarding the association 
between individual and contextual covariates and perceptions of mis-targeting. The previous stud-
ies that relate overuse and underuse perceptions to various individual-level covariates already pro-
vide clues. Most prominently, they find that ideology or party preference affect perceptions of both 
overuse and (to a lesser extent) underuse, where people with a right-wing political preference see 
higher overuse and lower underuse (Ervasti, 1998, 2012; Halvorsen, 2002; Sihvo and Uusitalo, 
1995a; Van Oorschot and Meuleman, 2011). Most studies also find a positive effect of income on 
overuse perceptions, although Ervasti (2012) reports a small negative effect. Moreover, education 
seems to be a relatively stable factor associated with overuse and underuse perceptions, where 
higher education reduces overuse and underuse perceptions (Ervasti, 1998, 2012; Halvorsen, 2002; 
Sihvo and Uusitalo, 1995a; Van Oorschot and Meuleman, 2011). Finally, the few significant effects 
of occupational class and employment status found in previous research differ among countries 
and studies. Given this inconclusive empirical evidence provided by existing studies, it is neces-
sary to address the associated individual and contextual covariates of overuse and underuse percep-
tions more theoretically.
First, we expect a relationship between structural position and (especially) normative percep-
tions of mis-targeting. In the literature, we find two different theories, both of which are introduced 
as competing hypotheses by Maassen and De Goede (1989), in which people’s structural position 
(by which we mean people’s level of income, education, and/or job status) is believed to shape 
their perceptions of the mis-targeting of benefits: identification theory and competition theory. 
Identification theory (Maassen and De Goede, 1989) suggests that because people occupying a 
lower structural position are at a higher risk of becoming dependent on welfare benefits, they are 
better able to identify with welfare recipients and therefore see less overuse and more underuse of 
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benefits. Additionally, to extend the interpretation of identification theory, people who have expe-
rienced benefit dependency or who have family members that rely on benefits are less suspicious 
of benefit abuse because they can better identify with beneficiaries. Generally, people who identify 
more strongly with beneficiaries perceive less intentional overuse and see more underuse because 
they may have a clearer eye for people’s shame about taking up benefits due to the stigmatization 
of benefit recipients. In contrast, people in a higher structural position or without a history of either 
benefit dependency or relatives relying on benefits presumably cannot easily identify with benefit 
recipients’ feelings of shame and stigmatization and see less underuse of benefits. The fact that 
people with high incomes must contribute more to welfare redistribution does make them more 
suspicious of potential abuse.
An alternative relationship between people’s structural position and perceptions of mis-target-
ing is suggested by competition theory. Here, Maassen and De Goede (1989) argue that people who 
are at risk of becoming dependent on benefits feel that they are in competition with welfare recipi-
ents. Occupation of a lower structural position increases the fear that people who abuse benefits 
will jeopardize the welfare system; therefore, the overuse of benefits is considered a substantial 
problem. People occupying a higher structural position, who do not feel competitive with respect 
to the welfare state’s scarce resources (or who feel less of a sense of competition), consequently see 
less overuse. Therefore, there are two conflicting theories about the influence of structural position 
(or structural position in the past or the position of relatives) on perceptions of mis-targeting. 
Occupying a lower structural position can lead to the normative perception either that access to the 
welfare state is too strict (identification theory) or that access to the welfare state is too easy, result-
ing in benefit abuse (competition theory).
Second, with respect to individuals’ ideological preferences, empirical studies have found that 
people with left-wing sympathies favor a more generous redistribution (Andress and Heien, 2001; 
Arts and Gelissen, 2001; Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989; Meier Jæger, 2006). With respect to our 
welfare attitudes of interest – perceptions of mis-targeting – we expect that people supporting left-
wing politics, who therefore favor a more generous redistribution, will tend to the normative judg-
ment that access to the welfare state is too strict: we expect them to believe that it is too difficult 
for people ‘in real need’ to obtain a benefit. Conversely, we assume that people with right-wing 
sympathies will tend to see access as too easy and that they will perceive more abuse of benefits. 
We note that theoretically, it is possible that attitudes about welfare determine political orientation 
and that the causal effect is thus reversed. However, a study by Meier Jæger (2008) using an instru-
mental variable approach shows that political self-orientation precedes the formulation of an atti-
tude toward the welfare state.
Third, we hypothesize a relationship between social trust and perceptions in mis-targeting. 
People with low interpersonal trust do not believe in other individuals’ good intentions. It is there-
fore logical to assume that low-trusting individuals will expect others to cheat or abuse the collec-
tive system. We therefore expect that low-trusting individuals will more easily see the moral flaws 
of mis-targeting. In addition, we believe that institutional trust is an important determinant of the 
perception of effective administrative targeting. Trust in institutions establishes trust in these insti-
tutions’ ability to redistribute welfare in a fair and effective manner. Therefore, we expect that high 
trust in institutions is associated not only with perceptions of effective targeting that are more posi-
tive but also with lower perceptions of overuse and underuse. We note that high perceived overuse 
and underuse could also lead to erosion of the social contract and trust in both institutions and one’s 
fellow citizens. It is likely that there is also a feedback effect, in which high trust leads to low per-
ceived mis-targeting and low perceived mis-targeting increases societal trust levels. In addition, we 
note that despite the fact that some studies do not find a clear empirical link between institutional 
trust and attitudes related to substantive justice such as the role of the state (Edlund, 2006; Svallfors, 
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1999, 2002), other studies do find evidence of a relationship between trust in the government and 
elements of procedural justice, such as the implementation of tax policies and attitudes toward 
financial cheating (Edlund, 1999, 2006; Svallfors, 2002).
Finally, we argue that information or knowledge about the practical aspects of the redistribution 
system has an important effect. From the literature on tax attitudes, it is known that more knowl-
edge increases satisfaction with the distribution of taxes (Eriksen and Fallan, 1996). Along the 
same line of reasoning, we expect people who are more informed about the implementation of 
benefit redistribution to be more convinced that this redistribution will be effective. Although edu-
cational background might only be an indirect (and therefore not very effective) measure of knowl-
edge about the effectiveness of the welfare redistribution, we expect that a higher educational 
background, holding all other socio-economic background characteristics constant, is associated 
with lower perceived mis-targeting. Previous research has found stable effects of educational back-
ground on overuse and underuse perceptions (Ervasti, 1998, 2012; Halvorsen, 2002; Sihvo and 
Uusitalo, 1995a; Van Oorschot and Meuleman, 2011).
Contextual factors influencing moral and administrative mis-targeting perceptions
Only a few studies have examined national differences in perceptions of overuse and underuse. 
Edlund (1999) concludes, after comparing Norwegian and American attitudes on financial cheat-
ing, that conflicts over welfare abuse show more cross-country variation than do attitudes about 
redistribution. Ervasti (2012) finds that people in Southern and Eastern European countries per-
ceive higher underuse of benefits than do people in other European countries; this study does not 
discuss country-level effects on perceptions of overuse. It is reasonable to say that cross-national 
differences related to overuse and underuse perceptions have not been thoroughly examined.
The most apparent national characteristic influencing perceptions of mis-targeting is a country’s 
actual percentages of benefit overuse and underuse. Individuals might notice whether welfare 
recipients in a particular country engage in a substantial amount of fraudulent behavior, or if many 
people in need do not receive financial support through country-level mass communication by the 
government or the media. However, data are available on actual overuse and underuse of welfare 
benefits for only a few countries. Occasional data on (non-) take-up rates of social benefits are 
available for Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands (Hernanz et al., 2004; Van Oorschot, 
1995). However, only the United Kingdom regularly produces official estimates of benefit fraud 
and take-up rates (Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), 2012a, 2012b). Moreover, many 
authors of single-country studies address the accuracy of their data because those data estimate 
benefit abuse based on numerous assumptions (Frick and Groh-Samberg, 2007; Hernanz et al., 
2004; Kayser and Frick, 2000). The limited availability of incomparable data renders a compara-
tive analysis impossible. We believe that because hardly any data are available, people most likely 
are unaware of actual mis-targeting in their country, and actual mis-targeting might, therefore, only 
marginally influence perceptions of overuse and underuse. Nevertheless, this study is limited by its 
inability to take this variable into account.
We now introduce three contextual covariates that might influence individual perceptions of 
mis-targeting. The first covariate is the amount of redistribution, which we argue will especially 
affect normative perceptions of mis-targeting. If the amount of welfare redistribution in a coun-
try is low, people can develop a perception of underuse because they see that those in need do 
not receive adequate benefits. At the same time, a country’s high level of welfare redistribution 
may strengthen individual perceptions that public money is wasted on beneficiaries, thus (fol-
lowing the same line of reasoning) leading to stronger perceptions of overuse. Because in the 
latter case the perceived amount of social spending applies, whereas in the former case the 
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perceived effect of redistribution is of interest, we use these two different measures for this 
hypothesized effect.
Second, one popular explanatory factor in the welfare attitude literature is welfare design in 
terms of welfare regime types (Albrekt Larsen, 2006; Arts and Gelissen, 2001). A specific element 
of the different welfare regime types (Esping-Andersen, 1990) is the difference between universal 
and targeted benefits (Korpi and Palme, 1998). We expect this particular difference in the institu-
tional design of the welfare state to influence perceptions about the mis-targeting of welfare ben-
efits. The argument can be made that in countries with more targeted (e.g. selective) benefit 
schemes compared to universal benefit schemes, where beneficiaries traditionally must fulfill more 
criteria to become eligible for a benefit (for instance, by means and/or assets tests for the individual 
or the household, or by complying with job-search requirements), people might be more concerned 
about the underuse of benefits. Simultaneously, in selective welfare states, people may see a lower 
risk of overuse because actual access to benefits is very strictly regulated, while in more universal 
welfare states, people may be more concerned with overuse of benefits because misuse would 
affect the welfare state more. However, and to the contrary, several studies argue that in countries 
with more selective policies, people are more suspicious of overuse (Coughlin, 1980; Edlund, 
1999; Rothstein, 1998; Svallfors, 1991). That is, when the welfare system imposes many and rela-
tively complex criteria for selecting its target group, there are more rules that can be broken, and 
people may paradoxically perceive more overuse in general. In countries with welfare systems that 
historically developed more targeted benefit schemes, people may be focused on potential abuse or 
misuse of benefits: do the people who receive a benefit really meet all of the criteria, or are they 
cheating? In countries with traditionally more accessible benefit schemes, such as universal wel-
fare states, these concerns may be smaller: because many citizens are included, there is less reason 
to be suspicious of potential misuse (Rothstein, 1998). We therefore expect that in countries with 
historically more selective benefit schemes, as opposed to more universal benefit schemes, norma-
tive perceptions of the overuse of benefits may be at a higher level. In addition, we expect that 
selective benefit schemes will have a positive effect on perceptions of administrative flaws in mis-
targeting. As noted above, selective benefit schemes impose many criteria and rules, which make 
the system more vulnerable to administrative mistakes and flaws compared to a system in which 
everybody is included.
Our third contextual-level explanation suggests a relationship between the economic situation 
in a country and perceptions of mis-targeting. Previous research shows that in Sweden, perceptions 
of benefit abuse fluctuate over time (Svallfors, 2011). There can be different explanations for this 
phenomenon, but one common explanation for fluctuating welfare attitudes is a country’s eco-
nomic situation (Jeene et al., 2013). In the literature, two opposing hypotheses are suggested that 
can be related to the identification and competition theory that we previously introduced at the 
individual level. On the one hand, different authors suggest that in a national situation of economic 
hardship and higher unemployment, people are more inclined to identify themselves with the situ-
ation of those depending on benefits because they are more aware of the general need for support 
(Sihvo and Uusitalo, 1995b) and beneficiaries’ inability to change their situation (Fridberg and 
Ploug, 2000). On the other hand, it is suggested that in times of economic hardship, people become 
less altruistic and care more for themselves (Alt, 1979; Durr, 1993); therefore, they are more suspi-
cious of others abusing benefits. Using longitudinal data, Jeene et al. (2013) test which of these 
hypotheses apply to perceptions of the deservingness of benefits claimants. They find support for 
the competition theory: economic hardship and times of unemployment cause people to be less 
generous to beneficiaries. Unfortunately, because we rely on cross-sectional data, we cannot meas-
ure effects over time. This restricts us from accurately modeling an effect of economic hardship as 
longitudinal. However, using the current year’s unemployment rate and in particular the decrease/
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increase in the unemployment compared to the previous year, we attempt to estimate this effect as 
accurately as possible. We use unemployment rate change instead of economic growth because 
people experience that more directly.
Data and methods
We use data from the European Social Survey, Round 4, 2008/2009. This survey provides an 
extended module on welfare state attitudes. We selected 25 of the 29 European countries 
(N = 47.489): Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Switzerland (CH), Cyprus (CY), the Czech Republic 
(CZ), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), the 
United Kingdom (GB), Greece (GR), Croatia (HR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Latvia (LV), the 
Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Sweden (SE), 
Slovenia (SI) and Slovakia (SK).1
The survey has five items that measure perceptions of mis-targeting in the context of attitudes 
toward the welfare state. Three of them are perceptions of overuse: ‘people are not trying to find a 
job’, ‘obtaining benefits to which they are not entitled’ and ‘not working and pretending to be sick’. 
Two measure perceptions of underuse: ‘people get less benefits than they are entitled to’ and ‘there 
are insufficient benefits for people in need’.2 Table 1 provides the wording of the survey questions. 
All of the items are measured on a five-point scale with higher scores indicating stronger percep-
tions of mis-targeting.
For our individual-level covariates, we use a measure of subjective income (because the meas-
ure of objective income has a high level of non-response), which asks people how they feel about 
their household income currently, offering four answer categories from ‘living comfortably’ to 
‘finding it very difficult on present income’. We include variables measuring employment status 
(the item measures ‘what have you been doing for the last seven days’): paid work (reference cat-
egory), unemployed (both actively looking for a job and not actively looking for a job), retired, 
permanently sick or disabled, and other non-labor (community work, housework, other). To meas-
ure people’s experience with relying on benefits, we add unemployment history, a dummy item 
asking a respondent whether he or she has been unemployed for more than 3 months during the 
previous 5 years.
For ideological position, we use the left/right self-placement scale (scale 0–10) split into three 
dummy variables: left (score 0–3, reference), middle (4–6), right (7–10). For interpersonal trust, 
we compute a means scale from three variables (scale 0–10) stating: ‘would you say that most 
Table 1. Operationalization and descriptive statistics of mis-targeting perceptions.
Scale 1–5 % (Strongly) 
agree
% (Strongly) 
disagree
Mean Standard 
deviation
Most unemployed do not really try to find a job 39 38 3.034 1.104
Many people manage to obtain benefits and 
services to which they are not entitled
64 16 3.620 .957
Employees often pretend that they are sick in 
order to stay home
38 36 3.029 1.071
Many people with very low incomes get less 
benefits than they are legally entitled to
52 21 3.394 .973
There are insufficient benefits in (country) to help 
the people who are in real need
63 19 3.603 1.021
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people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’, ‘do you think that 
most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?’ 
and ‘would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking 
out for themselves?’ Over the 25 countries, these items have an average scale reliability coefficient 
(alpha) of .75. For institutional trust, we computed a means scale of five variables (Scale 0–10): 
‘how much you personally trust each of the institutions: the parliament, the legal system, the police, 
politicians, political parties’. Over the 25 countries, this scale has an average scale reliability coef-
ficient (alpha) of .87. We use dummy variables for education as an additional measure of structural 
position: (less then) primary education (reference category), lower secondary education, higher 
secondary education and tertiary education. Finally, we add two control variables: gender (refer-
ence category: male) and age in years.
For the contextual-level measures, we use two different measures to assess a redistributional 
effect. These measures correlate r = .44. First, we use the traditional measure of social spending as 
the amount of expenditure on social protection as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) 
from Eurostat for 2008 (which has a high correlation with expenditures in previous years). Second, 
we calculate the difference between the percentage of the population ‘at risk of poverty before 
social transfers’ and the percentage ‘at risk of poverty after social transfers’ and use that as a meas-
ure for redistributional effect. Both are Eurostat measures from 2008. For the measurement of 
universal and selective policies, we use regime typologies as proxies because of a lack of compa-
rable institutional data for our 25 countries. We indicate the Anglo-Saxon countries (IE and GB) as 
having the most targeted benefits and the Scandinavian countries (DK, FI, NO, SE) as having the 
most universal benefits (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi and Palme, 1998). We expect the conserva-
tive (CH, BE, DE, FR, NL), the post-Communist (BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LV, PL, RO, SK, SI) and 
the Mediterranean (CY, ES, GR, PT) countries to be in between. We take the conservative regime 
as a reference category. For the unemployment rate, we use Eurostat data from 2008 measuring 
unemployed persons as a percentage of the labor force. For unemployment rate change, we use the 
difference between the unemployment rate in 2007 and the unemployment rate in 2008. The 
descriptive statistics for all of the context variables can be found in Table 5 in Appendix 1.
Methodological approach
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we apply confirmatory factor analysis to a range of mod-
els that express different relationships between the mis-targeting items. We test three different 
approaches. First, we test the idea that all overuse and underuse perceptions are part of a larger 
general perception of the mis-targeting of benefits. All of the items load on the same ‘mis-target-
ing’ factor (Model 1). Second, we test the conclusion reached by previous scholars, who suggested 
that overuse and underuse are two different types of mis-targeting perceptions. Here, the overuse 
items load on an overuse factor, whereas the underuse items load on an underuse factor (Model 2). 
Third, with two models (Model 3a and Model 3b), we test the idea that overuse and underuse per-
ceptions are driven by underlying attitudes related to perceptions of moral flaws and administrative 
mistakes in mis-targeting. In these models, overuse and underuse items could share some content 
over different factors, that is, these models allow for cross-loadings between factors. Model 3a 
estimates two factors that both load on all items, whereas Model 3b estimates two factors that 
(cross-)load on selected items. To evaluate the models, we assess two commonly used chi-
square-based measures of fit: the root means square error of approximation (RMSEA) and the 
comparative fit index (CFI). For a good fit, the RMSEA should have a value of <.05; a value 
between .05 and .08 implicates an acceptable fit. The CFI should be >.970; a value between .950 
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and .970 is acceptable (Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003). We select the model with the best fit and 
estimate the factor scores for the latent factors.
In the second step, the factor scores are used as dependent variables in further analysis. We 
employ a multilevel regression analysis to take into account the clustered structure of the data. We 
include both individual- and contextual-level covariates to explain the variation at the individual 
and country levels. We test a random intercept model in which the intercept varies over countries. 
We left the covariates uncentered because in random intercept models without cross-level interac-
tions, the model is invariant for these linear transformations (Hox, 2010). We introduce only one 
country-level variable per model because we address a limited number of countries. We present the 
proportion of reduced variance at the lower end of the tables (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). For all 
of the statistical analyses, we use the program Stata 13 (StataCorp, 2013).
Results
Descriptive results of mis-targeting items
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the different items. European people have a very strong 
perception of the overuse of benefits: 64 percent agree with the statement that many people manage 
to obtain benefits and services to which they are not entitled. Perceptions related to the aspects of 
overuse that can be called misuse of benefits (i.e. people who are not really looking for a job or 
people pretending that they are sick) are less negative: the European public seems divided about 
that issue, 39 percent and 38 percent, respectively, (strongly) agree with the statement, whereas 
38 percent and 36 percent, respectively, (strongly) disagree. With respect to the underuse of bene-
fits, people have a strong impression that there are insufficient benefits to help people who are 
deserving of welfare support: 63 percent (strongly) agree with that statement. In addition, the 
majority (52%) of Europeans believes that many people who are entitled to benefits do not receive 
them. These descriptive results are in line with previous research showing that European people 
perceive both high overuse and underuse of benefits. When we inspect the relationship between 
scales of the overuse and the underuse items, we find only a small correlation for the pooled sample 
on the individual level of r = .22. As in other studies, this shows that these attitudes are only weakly 
related to each other: perceiving high overuse does not necessarily mean perceiving high 
underuse.
Confirmatory factor analysis
Confirmatory factor analysis tests whether data fit the theorized measurement models. Table 2 
presents the results of this factor analysis based on the five mis-targeting items,3 testing the three 
theoretical approaches discussed in the ‘Methods’ section. For each model, we present the esti-
mated factor loadings and fit statistics.
The results show that as scholars previously argued, overuse and underuse perceptions do 
not belong to one concept of mis-targeting. Model 1, in which all items load on one factor and 
which measures general mis-targeting perceptions, has a poor fit, with an RMSEA of .155 and 
a CFI of .764.
Model 2 estimates a two-factor model in which three items load on the overuse factor and two 
on the underuse factor. This model tests the hypothesis that overuse and underuse perceptions are 
independent perceptions of mis-targeting. This model has a fit that is just around the cut-off point 
of a sufficient fit (the RMSEA is .080 and the CFI is .949). In other words, overuse and underuse 
perceptions can be observed as two independent concepts that are somewhat related to each other, 
although the fit of this model is borderline sufficient.
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Model 3a, tracking two underlying patterns by letting every item tap into both factors, is only 
identified because the number of estimated parameters is as large as the pieces of information that 
this model contains (we do not allow the factors to correlate which would lead to an underidenti-
fied model). Consequently, this model has no degrees of freedom, and no fit statistics can be evalu-
ated, which makes this model not statistically interesting.
There are several possible models that allow cross-loadings on the two factors. In order to iden-
tify the best fitting model with cross-loadings, we follow an approach which is known as ‘explora-
tory factor analysis within the confirmatory factor analysis framework’ (Brown, 2006; Muthén and 
Muthén, 2009). The result of this procedure4 provides us with a model in which the first factor that 
has significant factor loadings on the three overuse items and the second factor has significant fac-
tor loadings on one overuse item and both underuse items. We use this model in our confirmatory 
factor analysis. In this model (Model 3b), the first factor measures perceptions of benefit overuse. 
This factor contains two items that in our view clearly evaluate beneficiary intentions that are 
related to moral flaws (‘people do not try to find a job’ and ‘people pretend that they are sick’). This 
factor is not related to the underuse items. The second factor, however, consists of information 
from both overuse and underuse items. It loads on both the underuse items that suggest that people 
do not get what they deserve (‘people get less benefits than they are entitled to’ and ‘there are insuf-
ficient benefits for people in need’), and it loads on the overuse item that states that ‘people obtain 
benefits to which they are not entitled’. These items focus not on the intention of the beneficiary to 
misuse or to decline to take up benefits, but instead can be interpreted as system failures. This 
model (Model 3b) has a very good fit, with an RMSEA of .011 and a CFI of .999. Figure 1 presents 
a graphical overview of both factors.
We interpret the first factor of Model 3b, our model of choice, as normative perceptions of moral 
flaws in mis-targeting that constitute specific perceptions of intentional benefit abuse. People with 
high scores on this factor believe that people take advantage of the welfare redistribution system and 
intentionally aim to misuse welfare benefits or services. The second factor measures perceptions 
about the system’s administrative effectiveness.5 People with a high factor score on this factor see 
overuse and underuse at the same time, which can be interpreted as perceiving either an ineffective 
system or a system that makes administrative mistakes leading to both overuse and underuse. Both 
factors are correlated at r = .28, which suggests that they measure different attitude structures.
Table 2. Confirmatory factor analysis of mis-targeting perceptions.
Model Factor Factor loadings Correlation 
F1–F2
RMSEA CFI
 Item 1 
– not 
find job 
(overuse)
Item 2 
– obtain 
benefits 
(overuse)
Item 3 
– pretend 
sick 
(overuse)
Item 4 
– less 
benefits 
(underuse)
Item 5 – 
insufficient 
benefits 
(underuse)
 
M1 F1 .498 .618 .533 .352 .330 – .155 .764
F2 – – – – –
M2 F1 .541 .588 .584 – – .418 .080 .949
F2 – – – .630 .571
M3a F1 .083 −.151 .093 −.592 −.500 – Just 
identified
Just 
identified
F2 .562 .551 .620 .265 .241
M3b F1 .569 .455 .627 – – .281 .011 .999
F2 – .241 – 636 566
RMSEA: root means square error of approximation; CFI: comparative fit index.
 at KU Leuven University Library on January 5, 2015cos.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
12 International Journal of Comparative Sociology 
What we do not present here are the additional analyses that we employed to test the compara-
bility of this model across countries.6 That is, we tested this model in a multi-group structural equa-
tion model to determine whether it is measurement equivalent and can be compared over the 25 
countries in our sample (Davidov, 2008). This multi-group model has an acceptable level of meas-
urement equivalence (partial scalar equivalence) with a sufficient model fit (RMSEA of .074).
Multilevel regression analysis
To obtain more insight into the meaning of these underlying mis-targeting perceptions, we 
relate them to different covariates in a random intercept multilevel regression model. We use 
the factor scores of the normative and administrative factor from Model 3b (Table 2) as depend-
ent variables. First, we add the individual-level covariates (Table 3). Next, we add the country-
level factors for each model separately (Table 4), including the individual-level covariates as 
control variables.
For the first factor of normative perceptions of mis-targeting, we see that the indicators for 
structural position are positively associated with normative perceptions of mis-targeting. People 
who are more content with their income and are less likely to be unemployed, receiving an educa-
tion, disabled or sick have stronger normative perceptions of benefit abuse. Additionally, people 
who experienced unemployment for longer than 3 months in the previous 5 years are less inclined 
to see benefit abuse. These results support identification theory rather than competition theory, 
suggesting that people in a lower structural position and people who experienced unemployment 
perceive less benefit abuse because they can more easily identify with people who depend on ben-
efits. With respect to the second factor, the effects of lower perceived incomes run in a different 
direction. Although we did not formulate any expectations for the effect of structural position on 
administrative mis-targeting perceptions, we see that people with a lower perceived income per-
ceive more administrative mistakes. In addition, individuals who experienced unemployment for 
longer than 3 months are more critical of administrative effectiveness. Remarkably, people who are 
retired perceive both more normative and effective forms of mis-targeting.
Second, as expected and as found in previous research, we see a strong effect of right-wing 
political ideology on the normative perception of benefit abuse. People with a right-wing party 
affiliation have stronger perceptions of intentional benefit abuse. We see a smaller effect of party 
Abuse:
Not try find 
job
Abuse:
Obtain 
benefit
Underuse:
Insufficient 
benefits
Abuse:
Pretend to be 
sick
Underuse:
Less benefits 
entitled
Factor 1: 
Normative 
Mis-targeting 
Factor 2: 
Administrative
Mis-targeting 
Figure 1. Two-factor model of normative and administrative perceptions of mis-targeting.
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ideology on administrative perceptions of mis-targeting. People who are more left-wing affiliated 
see more procedural problems in mis-targeting, although the effect sizes are considerably smaller. 
This confirms the normative character of the first mis-targeting factor compared to the procedural 
character of the second factor.
Third, both interpersonal and institutional distrust are strongly associated with normative per-
ceptions of benefit abuse. People with low trust levels do not believe in others’ good intentions and 
expect them to violate the social contract and cheat on the collective system. We see again that the 
effects on administrative perceptions are weaker than the effects on the normative factor. As 
expected, people with low trust in government institutions generally are more suspicious of the 
effectiveness of the implementation of government policies and therefore see a larger amount of 
administrative mis-targeting. This effect is twice as strong as the effect of interpersonal trust on the 
administrative effectiveness factor. This confirms that the second factor should be interpreted as 
perceptions of government failure rather than moral flaws of benefit recipients.
Table 3. Multilevel regression models of individual covariates influencing normative and administrative 
perceptions of mis-targeting.
Factor 1 – Normative 
perceptions of mis-
targeting
Factor 2 – Administrative 
perceptions of mis-
targeting
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 0 Model 1
Intercept −.003 .258*** .000 .163***
Individual-level covariates
Subjective income .013*** −.018***
Job status (paid work is reference category)
 In education −.032*** −.008*
 Unemployed −.086*** .005
 Disabled −.029* .008
 Retired .054*** .006*
 Other −.003 −.003
Unemployment history −.020** .013***
Left/right self-placement (left wing ref.cat.)
 Middle .075*** −.009***
 Right .133*** −.012***
Interpersonal trust −.026*** −.006***
Institutional trust −.023*** −.012***
Education (primary education ref.cat.)
 Lower secondary education −.019* −.009**
 Higher secondary education −.066*** −.022***
 Tertiary education −.163*** −.053***
Age −.001*** −.000
Female (male ref.cat.) −.001 .004***
Variance components
Group .0186 .0131 .0053 .0027
Residuals .1725 .1602 .0264 .0250
% Group variance explained 29.57 49.06
% Residual variance explained 7.13 5.30
Number of observations: 38,393/number of groups: 25.
* p < .05, **p < .01, and ***p < .001.
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Finally, for both factors, a higher level of education means weaker perceptions of both normative 
and administrative mis-targeting. Although this is an indirect measure, we explain this effect by the 
fact that people who are more highly educated can be better informed about the actual implementa-
tion of welfare redistribution and how the government attempts to minimize both abuse and under-
use. The effect of educational background supports results from previous research on experiments 
about tax attitudes: the more information that people have and the more details that they know about 
the actual redistribution system, the more positive they are (Eriksen and Fallan, 1996).
The individual factors only explain approximately 5–7 percent of the individual-level variation 
of the administrative and normative factors, respectively. However, there is a strong composition 
effect. In normative and administrative perceptions of mis-targeting, 29 percent and 49 percent of 
the country variation, respectively, is explained by the composition of categories of individuals in 
these countries. This composition effect is mostly related to the Eastern and Southern European 
countries, where there are relatively more people with lower trust levels and people in lower struc-
tural positions than in the Northern and Western European countries.
Looking at the country-level effects that are presented for each model in Table 4, we see no 
effect of the amount of redistribution. In Model 2, social spending has no significant effect on 
normative perceptions of benefit abuse, and the effect of our alternative measure of redistributional 
impact in Model 3 is not significant. There is no evidence for the idea that people see benefit abuse 
because they feel that tax money is wasted. Low levels of social spending in a country are associ-
ated with the perception that there is administrative mis-targeting of benefits, most likely because 
people in low-spending countries see that those in need do not receive that to which they are enti-
tled because they do not belong to the target population. However, this effect is not strong, and 
little additional variance is explained. Our alternative measure of the amount of redistribution has 
no significant effect on administrative mis-targeting.
The welfare state regime types explain many variations at the country level in Model 4. We see 
that for normative perceptions of mis-targeting, the Anglo-Saxon regime has a strong positive 
effect and is the most important country-level factor associated with perceptions of benefit abuse. 
That supports our theory that in welfare states that historically have been more selective in their 
targeting of welfare policies, people are more suspicious of abuse. In welfare states with targeted 
benefits, there are more eligibility criteria and therefore, there are more rules that can be broken. 
Although welfare states have been developed from these regime types, the perceptions that people 
will easily break the rules and cheat the welfare system seem to be culturally anchored. Against 
expectations, we do not find any significant effect of the Anglo-Saxon countries on administrative 
mis-targeting perceptions. This suggests that targeted benefit schemes do not influence perceptions 
of administrative mis-targeting. We do find that the post-Communist and Mediterranean types of 
welfare regimes have strong effects on the administrative dimension. We believe that these effects 
are less related to the institutional design of the redistribution than they are to the economic chal-
lenges that confront these welfare regimes (Cerami, 2008; Ferrera, 1996). The lower quality and 
quantity of these welfare states make people more suspicious about whether the state is able to 
redistribute to the perceived target population, that is, the people in need of support.
Finally, in Models 5 and 6, we introduce our indicators of economic hardship. Neither unem-
ployment indicator has a significant effect on the normative factor. There is no support for either 
the idea that economic hardship increases sympathy with the beneficiaries or the idea that it 
increases competitiveness over scarce resources. However, as previously noted, this might be 
because with a lack of longitudinal data, we cannot model this accurately. The unemployment rate 
does have a positive effect on the administrative factor. This confirms our previous observation 
that people who live in welfare states that face more economic difficulties are more critical about 
whether the state is able to target benefits to all who are in need of support.
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Discussion and conclusion
The aim of this study was to broaden our understanding of perceptions of the mis-targeting of 
welfare benefits and the individual and contextual factors associated with these perceptions. We 
contributed to the literature by disentangling normative and administrative perceptions of mis-tar-
geting in benefit overuse and underuse and associate these aspects with different individual- and 
contextual-level variables.
We found that Europeans not only strongly perceive abuse and misuse of benefits but also per-
ceive substantial underuse of benefits. Using confirmatory factor analysis, we found that these 
strong perceptions of the overuse and the underuse of benefits contain more complex underlying 
attitudinal positions. Perceptions of overuse and underuse are not an expression of one underlying 
perception of mis-targeting, nor are they two independent dimensions. Instead, we found that 
underlying attitudes toward mis-targeting can best be captured in one normative factor that 
expresses perceptions of moral flaws of benefit recipients, and in one administrative factor that is 
positively related to both benefit overuse and underuse and expresses perceptions of administrative 
failure or an ineffective targeting by the welfare state.
Our interpretation of these different factors is confirmed by the results of a multilevel regression 
analysis in which we associated individual covariates as structural position (now and in the past), 
education, ideological affiliation, and interpersonal and institutional trust to the normative and 
administrative factors of mis-targeting. We confirmed that normative perceptions of mis-targeting 
are more strongly related to structural position and political ideology, whereas administrative per-
ceptions were more related to country-level differences. Additionally, low-trusting individuals see 
more mis-targeting in general and more benefit abuse in particular. Distrust in government institu-
tions is more strongly related than interpersonal distrust to administrative mis-targeting. Having a 
higher education is positively associated with lower perceptions of mis-targeting, which we inter-
pret as an indirect effect of having more detailed information about government redistribution. 
These covariates explain a modest amount of variation at the individual level but account for a 
strong composition effect that explains a substantial amount of variation among countries.
We also added country-level covariates, in which we found that the most important country-
level determinant of normative perceptions of mis-targeting is the Anglo-Saxon welfare regime. 
We explain this by the fact that Anglo-Saxon countries historically developed targeted benefit 
schemes, although those systems have become more hybrid over time. These schemes put more 
effort into determining whether benefit claimants are really deserving of benefits and focus more 
on detecting the possible abuse or misuse of benefits. It seems that as a result, perceived overuse is 
higher in these welfare states. The most important determinant for administrative perceptions of 
mis-targeting seems to be the economic situation and the actual quality of the welfare state. People 
living in welfare states confronted by stronger economic challenges and unemployment see more 
ineffective targeting of benefits.
Unfortunately, due to the relatively small number of countries studied, we were not able to 
include many covariates at the contextual level. This restricted us in exploring the combination of 
contextual factors in combination in more detail. To be able to weight the relative impact of these 
contextual effects, we need to be able to control for more country-level factors. The fact that only 
cross-sectional data were available prevented us from accurately estimating the effect of economic 
hardship on perceptions of mis-targeting. In addition, the unavailability of data about actual over-
use and underuse of benefits was a limitation of this study.
In conclusion, it is fair to say that in all European countries, not only overuse perceptions but 
also underuse perceptions are a potential threat to the legitimacy of the welfare state. These percep-
tions are expressions of both normative perceptions of moral flaws in benefit abuse and 
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perceptions of administrative mistakes. If governments want to address potential threats to the 
legitimacy of the welfare state, they need to take into account that mis-targeting perceptions are 
based upon both moral and administrative flaws in the system of welfare redistribution that should 
be tackled in different ways.
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Notes
1. We excluded four countries from our sample (Israel, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine) because we want to 
focus our analyses on European countries.
2. We note that the term ‘insufficient benefits’ can be interpreted as ‘inadequate benefits’ or as ‘benefits 
that are lacking’. In the former case, the item can be seen as a measure of mis-targeting, but in the latter 
case, it is possible to discuss whether this item measures support for more benefit schemes in general. 
The correlation of this item with items that measure support for a stronger governmental role, however, 
is substantially smaller than the correlation with the other underuse item. We argue that this item is there-
fore suitable to measure underuse perceptions.
3. We treated the items as though they have an interval scale although they are, strictly speaking, ordinal. 
We tested all of these models by also treating the items as ordinal data. This analysis showed comparable 
results. Because no RMSEA fit statistic is provided when specifying categorical items, we decided to 
present the results based on the interval scale. Results are available from the first author.
4. The ‘exploratory factor analysis in the confirmatory factor analysis framework’ approach proceeds as 
follows. As a first step, an exploratory factor analysis with rotated factors is estimated. For each fac-
tor, the item with the highest loading is defined as anchor item. The cross-loadings of the anchor items 
on the other factors are defined as zero. All other factor loadings are free. Factor variances are fixed 
to one. Next, this model is estimated as confirmatory factor model. For each of the factor loadings, 
standard errors are available, so that statistical significance can be determined (Brown, 2006; Muthén 
and Muthén, 2009). Following this procedure for Factor 1, ‘people pretend to be sick’ and for Factor 2 
‘people get less benefit than they are entitled to’ are defined as anchor items and their cross-loadings on 
the other factors are set to zero. In the confirmatory factor analysis, we find insignificant cross-loadings 
for ‘people do not try to find a job’ on Factor 2 and ‘there are insufficient benefits for people in need’ on 
Factor 1. As a result, in this model, the first factor loads on the three overuse items, and Factor 2 loads 
on ‘people obtain benefits they are not deserving of’ and the two underuse items. We use this model for 
further analysis.
5. To validate the interpretation of this administrative effectiveness factor, we relate its country-level scores 
related to a contextual-level measure of government effectiveness, which is based upon different opinion 
surveys of experts, institutions and enterprises evaluating the effectiveness of the state (World Bank – 
Worldwide Governance Indicators). The correlation between these variables is r = −.80, which prompts 
the conclusion that the interpretation of this factor is valid. The correlation between the normative factor 
(country level) and government effectiveness is much smaller: r = −.51.
6. Results available from the first author.
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Appendix 1
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for contextual-level covariates.
Contextual covariate Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Social spending as % GDP 22.45 5.38 12.70 31.29
Redistributional effect 24.28 5.75 11.8 39.7
Scandinavian countries 0.16 0.37 0 1
Anglo-Saxon countries 0.08 0.28 0 1
Conservative countries 0.20 0.41 0 1
Post-Communist countries 0.40 0.50 0 1
Mediterranean countries 0.16 0.37 0 1
Unemployment rate 6.33 2.10 2.5 11.3
Unemployment rate change −0.20 1.18 −2.5 3.1
GDP: gross domestic product.
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